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ABSTRACT
Version control systems are widely used in software develop-
ment and document management. Unfortunately, version-
ing confidential files is not normally supported: Existing
solutions encrypt the transport channel, but store data in
plaintext within a repository. We come up with an access
control solution that allows secure versioning of confidential
files even in the presence of a malicious server administra-
tor. Using convergent encryption as a building block, we
enable space-efficient storage of version histories despite se-
cure encryption. We describe an implementation of our con-
cept for the Subversion (SVN) system, and evaluate storage
efficiency and runtime of this implementation. Our imple-
mentation is compatible with existing SVN versions without
requiring changes to the storage backend.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; E.3 [Data Encryp-
tion]
General Terms
Security, Design, Algorithms, Experimentation, Performance
Keywords
Access control; version control systems; subversion; conver-
gent encryption; confidentiality; efficient storage
1. INTRODUCTION
Version control systems (VCS) have become an invaluable
tool for software development and are also used during the
creation of all kinds of documents. As their main feature,
they allow restoring any previous version of a file. Most VCS
also facilitate the collaboration of authors working together
on a project. Authors obtain the latest copy from the VCS,
work on that copy, and then commit an updated version to
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the VCS. A VCS will not normally store complete copies
of each version of a file: changes might only affect a small
fraction of that file, so only differences between two versions
are stored.
One of the most common VCS is Subversion (SVN), which
relies on a central server to store the history of versioned
files. Like other VCS, SVN is not well-suited for work-
ing with confidential files. The transport channel is usu-
ally protected, e.g. using TLS. However, once on the server,
each user with read access to the file system, as well as the
server’s administrators, can read the file. SVN allows to
define access rules, but their enforcement requires a com-
pletely trustworthy server. Users can encrypt the content
using external applications; unfortunately, this makes it im-
possible for the VCS to save only space-saving differences
between file versions—even with only one byte changed in
a long document, the encrypted versions will be completely
different. Moreover, key management does not tie in with
the versioning system. Even assuming there was a public-
key infrastructure (PKI) in place, granting users read access
to a file (and revoking that right later on) is a complex and
error-prone task. If a user is supposed to get access to more
than one file version, access rights must be granted (e.g., the
file must be encrypted with the respective user’s public key)
each time a new version is uploaded to the SVN repository.
Our contribution is to define a solution for securing access
to files in an SVN repository with the following properties:
• Rights can be managed individually for each file.
• Enforcing read access control through encryption al-
lows protecting the confidentiality of files even against
attacks by repository administrators.
• Despite encryption, space-saving differences are stored
instead of entire copies of each file version. To achieve
this, we allow attackers to see the positions of changes
made between different versions of the same file.
• We retain full compatibility with old software versions,
though not all features will work if either the client or
the server does not support our solution.
• Necessary key exchanges tie in with the SVN architec-
ture. They are authenticated without use of a PKI; a
shared secret between a pair of users is sufficient.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We
discuss related work in Sec. 2 and outline our goals in Sec. 3.
Sec. 4 presents the system design. The encryption scheme
that allows for storage efficiency is worked out in Sec. 5; a
security analysis follows in Sec. 6. Sec. 7 describes the imple-
mentation, which we analyze concerning storage / runtime
overhead in Appendix A. Sec. 8 concludes this paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES & RELATED WORK
While the concepts developed in this work might be ap-
plied to other VCS, we develop our access control solution
for the SVN [19] system. SVN uses a client/server architec-
ture. Each client stores a working copy, which contains both
the versions of the files last obtained from the server and
the versions edited by the user. After performing changes
to files, the client performs a commit operation to add the
changes to the repository; an update gets the latest contents
from the repository. Communication with the server can be
based on WebDAV [7], or can use a specific SVN protocol [4].
In both cases, the client only sends (or receives) the changes
with respect to the previously stored version.
The server stores the whole revision history of the files and
folders added to the repository as well as of property lists
containing metadata that can be associated to them. After
storing a revision, a user cannot change or delete contents
of already stored data. Several storage backends exist. The
most common one is FSFS [15, 3]; it stores the oldest version
of each file completely. Once a file is changed, FSFS only
stores the (binary) difference compared to a (not necessarily
the latest) previous version. This way, SVN provides data
deduplication between different revisions of individual files.
Data deduplication between different files is not provided.
Our goal to develop a secure and storage-efficient access
control solution for this system comprises two main chal-
lenges: A solution to allow convenient access rights manage-
ment that includes key distribution, and a concept for data
deduplication despite secure encryption. Work on secure
file systems faces similar challenges; however, the majority
of existing work focusses on the key distribution problem.
The secure file system SiRiUS [10] supports per-file access
right management by encrypting each file using a randomly-
generated key that is encrypted with the authorized users’
keys and stored as part of the file’s metadata. It supports
separate read / write access rights.
Plutus [12] also distinguishes between read and write ac-
cess rights, but groups files with equal access rights into file
groups and stores their keys in an encrypted, shared lockbox
to reduce key distribution costs. The authors introduce a
method called key rotation: On access rights changes, keys
are changed in a way that allows the computation of pre-
vious keys from the latest one, which prevents the need for
immediate re-encryption of file contents on key changes. Key
regression [9] fixes some security flaws of key rotation.
In contrast, in the Wuala1 distributed file system, Groli-
mund et al. [11] introduce a data structure called Cryptree
to explicitly store dependencies between arbitrary keys.
We use a simple, SiRiUS-like approach for key distribution
as it fits best into the SVN architecture: The other solutions
depend on relations between different files which are not
guaranteed to be available in SVN setups (for example, a
user might check out only a single file or directory).
Despite those systems that focus on key management, few
secure file systems provide data deduplication.
Farsite introduces a concept called convergent encryption
(CE) which we adapt in Section 5: They use a cryptographic
hash of a file as a key to encrypt that file, so identical files can
be recognized and deduplicated despite secure encryption.
Similar to the SiRiUS approach, that key is then encrypted
with the authorized users’ keys to grant them access rights.
1http://www.wuala.com/
The concept has been extended in [18]: The authors sug-
gest applying CE to chunks of a file, which are determined
using a context-sensitive chunking procedure, to allow data
deduplication even between similar files. Rashid et al. [17]
recently re-used this concept to build a privacy-preserving
data deduplication framework for cloud environments. We
describe and further extend the procedure of [18] in Sec. 5.
The Tahoe filesystem [20], in contrast, uses CE for dedu-
plication of entire files only. The authors introduce a con-
vergence secret, so the equality of files can only be detected
by users sharing that secret. This concept is similar to the
obfuscator we introduce to hide equality of chunks between
different files.
None of these approaches have been applied to VCSs. So
far, besides using secure channels for communication, exist-
ing VCSs only cope with integrity and authenticity. Git2
and Monotone3 ensure integrity of the version history (if a
trustworthy copy of the current version is available) and in-
tegrate the use of signatures. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to provide a fine-grained, storage-efficient ac-
cess control solution for a VCS that is resistant to a server
compromise and thus able to provide true confidentiality.
3. GOALS, THREATSANDASSUMPTIONS
The goal of this work is to protect the confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authenticity of specific file versions stored in an
SVN repository by providing a fine-grained, user-definable
access control solution. In more detail, our goals are:
• Compatibility: We limit ourselves to changes that only
extend the SVN architecture, without restricting interoper-
ability with existing SVN versions. This especially requires
independence of our solution from the used storage backend.
• Fine-Grained Access Control and Convenient Usability:
Our solution shall allow users of an SVN repository to pro-
tect their own files stored in the repository by defining access
rights for them. Users shall be able to individually grant
read and write permissions for a specific file, as well as per-
missions to manage the file’s access rights, to other specific
users. Access rights management shall be convenient inso-
far as key exchanges between users shall be performed auto-
matically when access rights are managed (we only require a
one-time manual key exchange per user for authentication).
• Integrity and Authenticity: If access rights have been as-
sociated to a file, our solution shall protect the file’s integrity
and authenticity: every authorized user shall be able to ver-
ify if the file’s contents have been written by an authorized
user according to the currently granted access rights on the
file. This shall hold even against active attackers with full
read/write access to the repository server. Note that since
the SVN architecture expects only the server to store the
whole revision history, we cannot provide protection against
malicious deletion (including rollbacks that correspond to
deleting revisions) by the server administrator.
• Confidentiality and Storage Efficiency: We want to pro-
vide confidentiality of files whose access rights have been
restricted. Thus, attackers with full read/write access to
the repository server shall not be able to read those files’
contents. This shall be ensured through encryption—using
an encryption scheme that is believed to provide IND-CCA-
secure encryption.
2http://git-scm.com/about
3http://www.monotone.ca/
However, we want to retain storage efficiency, which SVN
achieves by deduplicating data between different file revi-
sions. As SVN’s storage backend is transparent to the clients,
data deduplication has to be done at the server side, i.e. with-
out knowledge of file contents. This leads to a clear conflict
with the confidentiality goal. We resolve this conflict by al-
lowing to soften the security requirements when committing
further revisions of a specific file. Allowing attackers to see
the extent and positions of changes to a file (which includes
information about how file contents are moved between re-
visions) enables generation of ciphertexts suitable for SVN’s
server-side data deduplication techniques. Users may decide
for each file revision if this information leakage is acceptable.
For files whose access rights change frequently, users may
even decide to allow data deduplication between file revi-
sions with different access rights—again by softening the se-
curity requirements. In this case, some additional informa-
tion is leaked only to users who have or had legitimate rights
to read some revision of a file. They are able to decrypt any
parts of other revisions of the same file which were contained
in an already-known version and might also be able to verify
the existence of single plaintext fragments. Further, they are
able to derive very limited information from chunk bound-
aries of other revisions of that file (cf. Section 5).
Note that this information leakage is limited to information
leaked between revisions of a single file. We always hide
similarities between different files as SVN does not perform
data deduplication between files anyway.
We achieve these goals under some assumptions: As au-
thentication is password-based, we assume that attackers do
not know (and cannot break) these passwords. We further
assume that no attacker can break the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, and that used hash functions provide resistance
against preimage attacks as well as strong collision resis-
tance. Moreover, we assume the existence of a pseudoran-
dom permutation (PRP) which we use as encryption prim-
itive. Users are considered authorized for specific actions
w.r.t. a file version if they are granted the corresponding ac-
cess rights by a user with GRANT rights (i.e. a user allowed
to manage access rights) for that file version, as described
in Section 4.1. A file owner and other GRANT-authorized
users (as well as their SVN clients) are considered trustwor-
thy w.r.t. the specific file.
4. SYSTEM DESIGN
Our access control solution consists of two building blocks:
First, we design and integrate a suitable access control con-
cept for the SVN architecture. Second, we adapt an encryp-
tion scheme that achieves confidentiality without preventing
the use of data deduplication techniques such as SVN’s dif-
ference calculations. This section deals with the former.
4.1 Overview
The idea of our access control solution is to let the owner
of a file (i.e. the user adding that file to the SVN) decide on
its precise access rights. The following rights can be granted:
• READ: Allow to read the contents of the specific file.
• WRITE: Allow to modify a specific file’s contents.
• GRANT: Allow to grant arbitrary rights to and revoke
arbitrary rights from other users.
To this point, this definition of access rights seems rather
straightforward. However, the semantics of access rights
granted for a specific file are not that clear when rights can
be changed over time. While WRITE and GRANT rights
can be granted to as well as revoked from a user effectively
at any time, the impact of a READ right revocation is less
certain: The user could have made copies of the file revisions
he had access to, thus revoking the READ right would only
be effective regarding future but not previous revisions. To
make the effective rights clear and comprehensible, we tie
our access control mechanism to single file revisions instead
of whole files. In particular, we store all access-rights-related
information as metadata for a specific file revision. This
leads to minor limitations: According to the revision con-
cept of the SVN architecture, granted rights of archived file
revisions are immutable—a user is only able to change these
rights for future revisions of the file (so each access right
modification requires a commit). However, albeit rights are
tied to revisions, modifying a file or its access rights requires
the WRITE or GRANT right for the latest revision, thus
these rights can be revoked with immediate effect. Solely a
READ right for an old revision can be exercised by a user
even if he does not hold the right for the latest revision.
4.2 Access Rights
As described before, we distinguish between the rights
READ, WRITE and GRANT. They are enforced as follows:
• The READ right is enforced by encrypting the file con-
tents using a key triple (KR,KO ,KI) (for details see Sec. 5)
that is generated randomly by the file owner or anyGRANT -
authorized user and only made available to READ-autho-
rized users. All cryptographic operations are performed at
the client side and the keys are unknown to the repository, so
the server can only see the ciphertexts. Thus, access control
regarding this right can be resistant to a server compromise.
While the repository does not know the file contents, server-
side efficient storage of similar file revisions is retained by
using a special encryption scheme that is described in Sec. 5.
• GRANT access control is performed using a shared
secret key KG (again generated randomly by a GRANT -
authorized user like the file owner) that is only known to
GRANT -authorized users. This key is used to prove / verify
the integrity / authenticity of access rights, trust relation-
ships and cryptographic keys.
• The WRITE right is enforced by a simple server-side
ACL, since the repository administrator can modify or delete
ciphertexts anyway due to his physical access to the storage.
Whenever access rights are changed, the affected keys
are replaced by new keys that are chosen randomly by the
GRANT -authorized user’s client that performs the change.
4.3 Authentication and Key Exchange
To allow a convenient exertion of access rights, we do not
require the users to exchange those cryptographic keys man-
ually. Instead, every user u has to remember a single pass-
word CP (u) (which must differ from the one used to authen-
ticate to the repository) that allows him to exercise all of his
access rights. We use the repository as transport channel for
communication between users, so we need to minimize the
number of communication rounds. This works as follows:
1. An individual key KDH(f, u) is negotiated for every
user u of a file f using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange [6].
This key is made available both to the specific user u as well
as to every GRANT -authorized user of file f . For this, we
regard the group of GRANT -authorized users of a specific
file f as one party of the DH key exchange and the user u
as the other party. The private DH value of the GRANT
group is chosen by any GRANT -authorized user (e.g. the file
owner); the private DH value of u is chosen by u. We store
the public DH values in the file’s metadata. The private val-
ues of the GRANT group and of u are stored encrypted with
KG and CP (u), respectively, so that both u and GRANT -
authorized users are able to determine KDH(f, u) later on.
2. As the DH key exchange does not provide authenti-
cation, we authenticate the negotiated DH keys separately.
The idea is to build bidirectional trust chains from the owner
of file f (who is assumed to be trusted and serves as trust
anchor) to every user u—i.e. every user u is authenticated
by the file owner over a chain of trusted GRANT -authorized
users and vice versa. For this, every user u negotiates a se-
cret passphrase with an arbitrary GRANT -authorized user
using a separate channel (e.g. telephone), which is used
by them to authenticate each other. We use a symmet-
ric HMAC-based authentication mechanism; details of this
protocol are omitted due to space restrictions.
3. The access rights granted to a user u are stored in the
file’s metadata and authenticated using an HMAC keyed
by KG so that modifications can be detected by GRANT -
authorized users. To allow exertion of access rights, the
keys associated to an access right are stored within the file’s
metadata—encrypted with the key KDH(f, u) for every au-
thorized user u. Since KDH(f, u) is known to all GRANT -
authorized users, changed keys can be distributed easily to
the users by simply encrypting the new keys withKDH(f, u).
5. ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In principle, we could use any secure encryption scheme
for encrypting file contents. However, traditional schemes
would prevent data deduplication between similar file revi-
sions. To achieve storage efficiency, we use a special encryp-
tion scheme that we describe in this section.
Unfortunately, data deduplication and secure encryption
are conflicting goals as the former has to depend on simi-
larities between contents which the latter requires to hide.
This leads to an inevitable trade-off. The benefit of our en-
cryption scheme lies in the fact that it allows to adjust this
trade-off: The encryption of single file revisions achieves the
same security properties as the underlying encryption func-
tion (e.g. AES). However, when further revisions are stored,
the user may choose to leak a limited amount of information
to allow data deduplication.
Towards this goal, our encryption scheme requires a triple
of keys (KR, KO,KI) instead of a single encryption key. KR
corresponds to the classic encryption key that is used to en-
sure confidentiality. It may be used for an arbitrary amount
of encryptions, but has to be changed whenever access rights
of the encrypted content change. KI is used similarly to en-
sure integrity / authenticity. KO—the obfuscator—serves as
a kind of secret initialization vector (IV). Using a unique IV
for every encryption achieves the strongest security guaran-
tees. However, in contrast to other schemes, using the same
IV for multiple file revisions is secure insofar as it only leaks
a controlled amount of information: Fixing KO only results
in deterministic encryption—both regarding a whole plain-
text as well as variable-length chunks within a plaintext. By
revealing which parts have changed between two revisions,
this allows data deduplication between ciphertexts of similar
file revisions. Thus, a user may achieve storage efficiency by
re-using KO of an ancestor when creating a new file revision.
To achieve this, we adapt the concept proposed by Storer
et al. [18]. Their idea is to split a plaintext m into so-
called chunks using a context-sensitive chunking procedure
before encrypting each chunk deterministically using conver-
gent encryption (see Section 2). This way, identical chunks
result in identical ciphertexts. The concatenation of those
encrypted chunks forms the ciphertext of m. Unfortunately,
this solution would have some shortcomings in our usage sce-
nario: First of all, it would not only leak similarities between
different revisions of a file, but also between different files,
as contents are encrypted independent of the encryption key.
Furthermore, due to the context-sensitive chunking, chunk
boundaries leak some information about the plaintext m.
Even worse, deterministic encryption of chunks could also
leak information about the structure of m, as repeating con-
tents would lead to repeating chunks and thus to repetitions
in the ciphertext.
To overcome these shortcomings, we modify their concept
in two points: First, we make the chunking procedure and
the computation of chunk-specific keys depend on KO to
limit CE’s security implications to the scope of a specific
value of KO. Secondly, we introduce appearance counters
which are involved in chunk boundary determination and
chunk encryption to prevent potential security risks regard-
ing files with repeating contents.
We continue with a formal description of our scheme.
5.1 Formal Description
In this section, we describe our encryption and authen-
tication scheme Π = (Gen,EncMac,Dec) following the
notations defined in [13]. We later analyze our encryption
scheme’s security in the random oracle model [1], so we as-
sume the existence of a random oracle H. As we focus on
the encryption scheme, we refer to the contents of files and
file revisions as messages in the remainder.
Requirements
We build upon an existing pseudorandom permutation (PRP)
F (with Fk(x) denoting F (k, x)) as defined in [13, Section
3.6.3] analogous to [13, Definition 3.23]:
Definition. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an effi-
cient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a
pseudorandom permutation if for all probabilistic polynomial-
time distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function negl
such that:
∣∣∣Pr[DFk(·)(1n) = 1]− Pr[Df(·)(1n) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
where k ← {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly at random and f is
chosen uniformly at random from the set of permutations
mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
Further, we build upon an existing MAC function ΠM =
(GenM ,Mac,Vrfy) with unique tags. Again, we expect
GenM to return a uniform random number in {0, 1}n.
Utilizing the random oracleH, we define two different hash
functions HR,HS : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
Definition of Π
We construct Π from a to-be-defined private-key encryption
scheme Π̂ = (Ĝen, Ênc, D̂ec) and the MAC function ΠM
according to [13, Construction 4.19]:
• Gen, on input 1n, runs Ĝen and GenM to obtain keys
K and KI , respectively.
• EncMac, on input key (K,KI) and message m, com-
putes c← ÊncK(m), t←MacKI (c) and outputs (c, t).
• Dec, on input a key (K,KI) and a ciphertext (c, t),
outputs D̂ecK(c) if VrfyKI (c, t) = 1; otherwise, ⊥ is
returned.
Definition of Π̂
The key-generation function Ĝen is defined as follows: On
input 1n, it outputs a key tuple (KR,KO) withKR,KO each
being chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
The encryption function Ênc is more complex: When get-
ting a key K = (KR,KO) and a message m as input, it first
splits the message into chunks, before performing separate
encryptions for the individual chunks. The phases of Ênc
are now described in detail.
5.1.1 Chunking
Chunking is performed in a similar way as introduced in
[14] and presented in the convergent encryption scenario in
[18]: A sliding window (fixed size: w bytes) is moved over
the message m and the windows’ contents mp,w are used
as input for the hash function HR to compute a pseudo-
random fingerprint at every byte position p (the authors of
[14] and [18] use a rolling hash function to compute those
fingerprints). The positions whose fingerprints are below a
specific threshold T are used as chunk boundaries. We make
three changes to the original procedure: First, we calcu-
late the fingerprints using HR(k, i, x) with k := KO, so that
chunking depends on KO . Secondly, we prevent repeating
window contents from resulting in the same fingerprint by
including an appearance counter i in the fingerprint calcu-
lation. Thirdly, we introduce a minimum chunk size of l
bytes. More formally, we create a chunk boundary at every
byte position p that meets the following condition:
p− l ≥ maxp′,p′<p{p′ = 0 ∨ p′ is a chunk boundary}∧
HR
(
KO,
∑
mp′,w=mp,w,p′<p
1, mp,w
)
< T (1)
By choosing T = 2
n
S−l+1 with a to-be-chosen parameter
value S ≥ l, Condition 1—applied to random data—is ex-
pected to hold for every S-th byte, resulting in chunks with
an average length of S bytes. This is indeed also true for
non-random data, as will be discussed in Appendix A.
5.1.2 Chunk encryption
Let m1, . . . ,mq be the chunks resulting from the chunk-
ing procedure described above, numbered in the order of
their appearance. For each chunk mj , we compute a chunk-
specific encryption key Kmj which we use to encrypt the
chunk’s contents. Instead of using a simple hash value of
the chunk contents—as done in [18]—we compute this key
as follows:
Kmj = HS
(
KO,
∑
mj′=mj ,j′<j
1, mj
)
(2)
Again, the usage of KO ensures that different keys are
computed for equal chunks in different messages, unless the
same valueKO was explicitly used for different encryptions—
e.g. for different revisions of the same file. To avoid equal
encryption of equal chunks within the same message, an ap-
pearance counter is used. This counter is 0 for the first and
i−1 for the i-th occurrence of the same chunk, thus multiple
equal chunks get unique keys.
The key Kmj is then used to encrypt the chunk contents
using the pseudorandom permutation F . For technical rea-
sons, we prefix the chunk content with its length before en-
crypting it4. Kmj is then encrypted (using the key KR)
and stored within the encrypted chunk representation. To
summarize, every chunk mj is encrypted as follows (with ‖
being the concatenation operator):
cj =
(
FKR (Kmj ), FKmj (length(mj) ‖mj)
)
(3)
5.1.3 Finalization
When all chunks have been encrypted, their ciphertexts
c1, . . . , cq are concatenated to build the ciphertext c of the
whole message:
Ênc(KR,KO)(m) =
(fq
j=1 cj
)
(4)
The decryption function D̂ec is straightforward: On input
a key K = (KR,KO) and a ciphertext c, it sequentially
decrypts the chunks c1, . . . , cq: For every chunk cj = (c
k
j , c
c
j),
it first determines the chunk key Kmj := F
−1
KR
(ckj ) and then
decrypts the chunk content and length by invoking lj ‖mj :=
F−1Kmj (c
c
j). Finally,
fq
j=1mj is output. Note that decryption
depends only on KR, not on KO .
5.2 Advantages
If every encryption application uses a random KO, our
scheme achieves CCA-secure encryptions, as we prove in
Sec. 6.1. However, it can achieve storage efficiency within
the SVN scenario when used as follows:
• Assign random keys KR,KO,KI to every file; change
them only on access rights changes.
As long as appearance counters are not affected, using the
same KO for multiple file revisions results in a deterministic,
context-sensitive chunking, which achieves identical chunks
within unchanged parts between those revisions—even if the
positions of those unchanged parts change between revisions
(i.e. sth. is inserted or removed). Due to the adaption of
convergent encryption, these chunks result in the same ci-
phertext everytime they are encrypted (both chunk key gen-
eration and encryption are deterministic). This way, cipher-
texts of similar file revisions overlap, so SVN’s storage back-
end can perform data deduplication while neither requiring
knowledge about the file’s actual contents nor about the
specific encryption scheme. As SVN uses differences during
update/commit operations (cf. Sec. 2), this also reduces the
network traffic between clients and the repository.
If appearance counters are indeed affected by changes made
to a file, different file revisions might get slightly different
chunkings, thus preventing deduplication of some chunks.
Our evaluation results (see Appendix A) suggest that the
storage overhead caused by this limitation is negligible.
Note that this only allows data deduplication between dif-
ferent revisions of a specific file as long as its access rights are
unchanged. Data deduplication across access rights changes
can also be achieved by only changing KR and KI on access
rights changes (avoiding influences on chunking and encryp-
tion of chunk contents). However, this scenario would leak
some additional information to attackers with access rights
to some other revision of a specific file (see Sec. 6.2.2).
4When instantiated with a block cipher, this prevents the
need for explicit chunk separators in the ciphertext, since
decrypting the first few bytes of a chunk allows computing
the starting position of the subsequent chunk.
5.3 Implementation Details
While our encryption scheme is independent of its un-
derlying cryptographic functions, its application requires an
appropriate choice of these functions. We use SHA-256-
HMAC [8] as MAC ΠM and instantiate the random oracle
H with SHA-256; queries prefixed by a key are performed
using SHA-256-HMAC (with the key used as key instead of
a prefix). The pseudorandom permutation F is instantiated
with AES-256-CBC [5], with the IVs being chosen as follows
to achieve deterministic encryption:
For encryption of the chunk content, we set IV = 0. While
this is considered to be insecure in general use cases, our
content-based key generation guarantees that we never en-
crypt different data using the same key. This makes the zero
vector unique in the scope of the used encryption key.
For encryption of the chunk key, the situation is not that
simple: Since the same key KR is used to encrypt different
chunk keys, we cannot use a constant IV here. We solve this
by using the first block of the ciphertext of a chunk as IV
for the encryption of its corresponding chunk key5. Since no
two chunks have the same key, these ciphertext blocks differ
for different chunks, resulting in a unique IV. Effectively,
this makes the first block of the chunk key encryption and
the second block of the chunk content encryption depend
on the same IV, but since different keys are used for these
encryptions, the uniqueness property is retained.
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our encryption scheme’s security guarantees depend on
its usage: We achieve IND-CCA-secure encryption assuming
the existence of a PRP and a random oracle when random
values KO are used for each encryption application
6. Oth-
erwise, some controlled amount of information is leaked to
allow data deduplication. We analyze both variants’ security
guarantees—regarding attackers that neither know KR, KO
nor KI—separately in this section. The security analysis
follows the definitions and proofs given in [13].
6.1 IND-CCA with random KO
To formalize the usage scenario where a random value
KO is used for each encryption application, we consider a
slightly modified version Π∗ of our encryption and authen-
tication scheme Π, which replaces the encryption part Π̂ of
the scheme with Π˜ = (G˜en, E˜nc, D˜ec):
• G˜en(n) invokes (KR,KO)← Ĝen(n) and returns KR.
• E˜ncKR (m) invokes ( ,KO) ← Ĝen(n) to generate a
random KO and returns Ênc(KR,KO)(m). (The de-
notes that the first component is ignored.)
• D˜ecKR(c) simply invokes m ← D̂ec(KR,⊥)(c) and re-
turns m (note that KO is not used in decryption).
The only difference between Π and Π∗ is that the latter
does not include a static value KO in the key material, but
chooses a random value KO during each encryption.
We want to show that Π˜ and Π∗ are CPA-secure and CCA-
secure, respectively. For this, we define some variants Π˜i
of the encryption scheme Π˜. In addition to F,HR,HS, we
let Π˜i have access to 2
n different truly random permuta-
tions f0(·), . . . , f2n−1(·) (one truly random permutation cor-
responds to each key of the PRP F ), and define it as follows:
5This also saves us the need for storing the IV separately.
6This always applies to files with only a single revision.
• G˜eni = G˜en, D˜eci = D˜ec
• E˜nci, on input key KR and message m, acts like E˜nc,
but changes the—overall7—first i queries to F so that
the invocation FK(x) is replaced by a query fK(x).
It is easy to see that Π˜0 = Π˜. Note that for i > 0, Π˜i
does not represent a correct encryption scheme, as E˜nci
can produce ciphertexts that D˜eci cannot decrypt. We can
ignore this since the Π˜i’s are only auxiliary constructions
and our proof does not depend on the existence of D˜eci.
Theorem. IfHR,HS are random oracles, Π˜∞ achieves IND-
CPA-secure encryption.
Proof. Our first goal is to show that Π˜ achieves IND-
CPA-secure encryption if all PRP invocations are replaced
by invocations of truly random functions. We denote this
variant by Π˜∞ to indicate that i→∞.
By [13, Definition 3.21], “a private-key encryption scheme
Π˜i is IND-CPA-secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl such
that Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n), where the prob-
ability is taken over the random coins used by A, as well as
the random coins used in the experiment.” The experiment
PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) is defined as follows in [13, Section 3.5] (for
convenience, we adapt the presentation to our notations):
1. A key K is generated by running G˜eni(1
n).
2. The adversary A is given input 1n and oracle access
to E˜nciK (·), and outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 of
the same length.
3. A random bit b← {0, 1} is chosen, and then a cipher-
text c← E˜nciK (mb) is computed and given to A. We
call c the challenge ciphertext.
4. The adversary A continues to have oracle access to
E˜nciK (·), and outputs a bit b′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b′ =
b, and 0 otherwise. (In case PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) = 1, we say
that A succeeded.)
Now let A be any adversary solving this experiment in
polynomial time q(n) (with q(n) being the number of steps
A may perform—including queries to E˜nciK , HR, HS and
f0, . . . , f2n−1). The intuition of our proof is as follows: A
can only learn sth. about the challenge, if he sees any of the
(random) values output by HR,HS, fk during encryption of
mb at any other point of time. We show that this happens
with negligible probability.
Let HQ denote the event that any query to HR or HS dur-
ing encryption ofmb in step 2 is also made at any other point
of time during the experiment. Similarly, let FQ denote the
event that a specific query fk(x) during encryption of mb
occurs at any other point of time. If all of those queries are
unique (i.e. HQ ∨ FQ), A has never seen any of the values
output by HR (cf. Eq. 1), HS (cf. Eq. 2) or any f (cf. Eq. 3)
that are used to produce the ciphertext of mb. As HR, HS
are modelled using a random oracle and as fk produces truly
random outputs, those values are independent from m0,m1
in A’s view. Thus, A’s chance to succeed is 1
2
:
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1 | HQ ∨ FQ] = 1
2
(5)
Repetitions of queries to HR,HS within a single encryp-
tion are excluded due to the appearance counters. As each
7This means the first i queries during Π˜i’s whole lifetime.
query to HR and HS includes the key KO, which is cho-
sen uniformly at random during encryption, a repetition of
some query to HR or HS requires that the same value KO
was either chosen by chance during another encryption ap-
plication or that it was guessed by A during his runtime.
The chance for this to happen within runtime q(n) is:
Pr[HQ] ≤ q(n)
2n
(6)
We now analyze the probability of FQ under HQ (i.e. the
case where all HR, HS queries are unique). A repetition of a
query to some fk during encryption of mb can occur either
during other encryptions or due to direct queries by A. Both
cases are analyzed separately in the following paragraphs:
E˜nciK queries the truly random permutations by fK(j)
and fj(·) for every output j produced by HS (i.e. for each
chunk key, cf. Eq. 3). Thus, if all outputs j of HS are unique,
all queries fK(j), fj(·) are unique. As we assume HQ, no
repetition of a query to HS occurred, so a repetition of a
query to any fk during encryption requires that at least two
different queries to HS produced equal outputs during the
experiment. As A has runtime q(n), he can only query the
encryption of messages of length at most q(n). During en-
cryption of a message of length q(n), at most q(n) queries
are made to HS, resulting in a maximum number of q(n)
2
queries to HS during the whole experiment. As HS gener-
ates outputs of length n bits, the collision probability of HS
during the experiment is bounded by q(n)
22
2·2n .
A repetition of a query to fk might also occur due to an
explicit query by A. However, if no repetition of a query to
HS occurred, this requires that A correctly guesses at least
one chunk key j for which a query fK(j) or fj(·) is made by
E˜nciK during encryption of mb. As A has runtime q(n) and
as there are at most q(n) chunk keys each having a length
of n bits, the chance for this to happen is bounded by q(n)
2
2n
.
We conclude:
Pr[FQ | HQ] ≤ q(n)
22
2 · 2n +
q(n)2
2n
=
q(n)4 + 2 · q(n)2
2n+1
(7)
Combining Equations 5, 6 and 7, we get:
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1]
= Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1 | HQ ∨ FQ] · Pr[HQ ∨ FQ]
+Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1 | HQ ∨ FQ] · Pr[HQ ∨ FQ]
≤ Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞ (n) = 1 | HQ ∨ FQ] + Pr[HQ ∨ FQ]
≤ 1
2
+ Pr[HQ] + Pr[FQ]
=
1
2
+ Pr[HQ] + Pr[FQ | HQ] · Pr[HQ] + Pr[FQ | HQ] · Pr[HQ]
≤ 1
2
+ 2Pr[HQ] + Pr[FQ | HQ] ≤ 1
2
+
2q(n)
2n
+
q(n)4 + 2q(n)2
2n+1
=
1
2
+
q(n)4 + 2 · q(n)2 + 4 · q(n)
2n+1
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) (8)
This proves that Π˜∞ is IND-CPA-secure.
Theorem. If F is a pseudorandom permutation and HR, HS
are random oracles, Π˜ achieves CPA-secure encryption.
Proof. We already know that Π˜ achieves CPA-secure
encryption if only truly random permutations are used. We
will show that A’s advantage is negligible if only single invo-
cations of some truly random permutation are replaced by a
PRP. As there is only a polynomial amount of invocations,
we conclude that Π˜ is also CPA-secure using only a PRP.
Regard any polynomially bounded adversary A with run-
time q(n). Our goal is to show that Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜(n) =
1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n). We know that Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(n). Due to his runtime q(n), A can make at most
q(n) queries to E˜nciK , with each queried message having
a maximum length of q(n). As the encryption operation
performs at most one query to Fk and fk, respectively, for
every byte of its input, a maximum of 2q(n)2 queries to
Fk/fk may occur within the whole experiment. Within this
runtime, Π˜∞ and Π˜2q(n)2 behave equally, so we have:
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜
2q(n)2
(n) = 1] = Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜∞
(n) = 1]
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) (9)
Next we show that A cannot distinguish the experiments
PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) and PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1
(n) with non-negligible prob-
ability. We do this by defining a polynomial-time distin-
guisher DF
′(·) as follows:
1. Run A(1n) and simulate the oracle E˜nciK (·) by exe-
cuting the algorithm E˜nciK to answer A’s oracle que-
ries—with one modification: When the—overall—i-th
query to a (pseudo-)random permutation (F or f) is
made, use F ′ instead of fK(x).
2. When A outputs messages m0,m1, choose b ← {0, 1}
randomly and return E˜nciK (mb).
3. Continue answering oracle queries by A as in step 1.
4. When A outputs b′, output 1 if b′ = b, otherwise 0.
If D is instantiated with the PRP F ′, the only difference
between D and experiment PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1
(n) is that F ′(x) is
queried instead of Fj(x) at any point of time. As there might
be other queries to Fj during the experiment, two situations
might lead to inconsistent behavior: Fj(x) might be queried
at any other point of time during the experiment and pro-
duce different output than F ′(x), or F ′(x) might produce an
output that is also output by Fj(y), y 6= x at any other point
of time during the experiment. As the experiment allows at
most 2q(n)2 invocations of Fj , the probability of the latter is
upper-bounded by 2q(n)
2
2n
. Further, as all invocations Fj(x)
done by E˜nciK include an n-bit number chosen uniformly
at random (cf. Equation 3), a repetition of the invocation
Fj(x) requires that this n-bit value has been chosen again
by chance or has been guessed by A. The probability for
this to happen is upper-bounded by 2q(n)
2
2n
, too.
If neither of these situations occur, we can think of DF
′(·)
as using a slightly modified PRP F˜ (for the whole experi-
ment) that is defined exactly like F , but switches two values
so that its outputs are consistent to F ′: F˜j(x) = F ′(x) and
F˜j(F
−1
j (F
′(x))) = Fj(x). As F˜ is a PRP, the view of A
when run by D is distributed identically to the view of A
in experiment PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1
(n). As the probability for this
situation is at least 1− 4q(n)2
2n
and D outputs 1 whenever A
succeeds in the experiment, we know that:
Pr[DF
′(·)(1n) = 1] ≥
(
1− 4q(n)
2
2n
)
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1
(n) = 1] (10)
If D is instantiated with a truly random permutation f ′,
the only difference between D and experiment PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n)
is that f ′(x) is queried instead of fj(x) at any point of time.
We can use the same arguments as before to show that the
view of A when run by D is distributed identically to the
view of A in experiment PrivKcpaA,Π˜i(n) with probability at
least 1 − 4q(n)2
2n
. Assuming that A succeeds in any other
case, we can give an upper bound:
Pr[Df
′(·)(1n) = 1]
≤
(
1− 4q(n)
2
2n
)
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) = 1] +
4q(n)2
2n
(11)
As we know (by assumption) that F ′ is a PRP, we get:
negl′(n) ≥ Pr[DF ′(·)(1n) = 1]− Pr[Df ′(·)(1n) = 1]
≥
(
1− 4q(n)
2
2n
)
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1
(n) = 1]
−
(
1− 4q(n)
2
2n
)
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i
(n) = 1]− 4q(n)
2
2n
We can solve this to get:
negl′′(n) ≥
(
negl′(n) +
4q(n)2
2n
)
· 1
1− 4q(n)2
2n
≥ Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1(n) = 1]− Pr[PrivK
cpa
A,Π˜i
(n) = 1] (12)
Combining Equations 9 and 12, we conclude:
Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜(n) = 1] = Pr[PrivK
cpa
A,Π˜0
(n) = 1]
≤ Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜
2q(n)2
(n) = 1]
+
∣∣∣∣Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜0(n) = 1]− Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜2q(n)2 (n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n)
+
2q(n)2∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i−1 (n) = 1]− Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜i(n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) + 2q(n)2 · negl′′(n) ≤ 1
2
+ negl′′′(n) (13)
This proves that Π˜ is CPA-secure.
Theorem. If Π˜ achieves IND-CPA-secure encryption, Π∗
achieves IND-CCA-secure encryption.
Proof. As Π∗ is an instantiation of [13, Construction
4.19] (see Sec. 5.1), we can apply [13, Theorem 4.20], whose
proof can be found in [13, Chapter 4.8]: “If ΠE is a CPA-
secure private-key encryption scheme and ΠM is a secure
message authentication code with unique tags, then Con-
struction 4.19 is a CCA-secure private-key encryption sche-
me.” Since Π˜ is CPA-secure and ΠM is a secure message au-
thentication code with unique tags, Π∗ is CCA-secure.
6.2 Security Guarantees with fixed KO
If KO is re-used for multiple encryptions (in our system,
this can be the case for different revisions of the same file),
we intentionally leak some information to allow data dedu-
plication. We allow a possible attacker to see relations be-
tween different messages that are encrypted with the same
KO , so he might recognize the positions and the size of plain-
text fragments that are identical between different messages.
This shall even be true if equal plaintext fragments appear
at different positions within different messages.
This is a rather specific use case which prevents the ap-
plication of classic security properties like ciphertext indis-
tinguishability. However, we want to show that re-using KO
retains some basic notion of security. While we leak informa-
tion about identical contents in different messages, we can
prove that we do not leak any information about different
contents that are encrypted using the same value KO .
6.2.1 Security Guarantees for Different Plaintexts
To formalize this, we introduce a restricted variant of
the PrivKcpaA,Π̂(n) experiment seen in the previous section:
the chosen different plaintext attack (CDPA) experiment.
PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂ (n) is defined exactly like PrivK
cpa
A,Π̂(n), with the
difference that A is only allowed to ask for encryptions of
messages which do not have an overlapping fragment with
more than d bytes size. Thus, all substrings occuring in more
than one message (including both queries A makes to ÊncK
as well as the messages m0,m1) must have a maximum size
of d bytes. If A does not adhere to these constraints, the
output of the experiment is defined to be 0.
Analogous to the previous definition, we say an encryption
scheme Π̂ is CDPAd-secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl
such that Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂ (n) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(n). Again, the
probability is taken over the random coins used by A and
the random coins used in the experiment.
We emphasize that this is a significantly weaker security
model than CPA security, since we cannot hope to show
strong security properties when intentionally leaking infor-
mation to an attacker. The security proof shall merely pro-
vide an intuition that our scheme does not leak information
in situations where we do not explicitly require it to do so.
Theorem. If Π˜ achieves CPA-secure encryption, Π̂ achieves
CDPAd-secure encryption for d = min{w, l} − 1.
Proof. To show this, we need to define another variant of
our encryption scheme Π̂ first. Let Π̂i = (Ĝeni, Ênci, D̂eci)
be defined as follows:
• Ĝeni = Ĝen, D̂eci = D̂ec
• Ênci, on input key (KR,KO), invokes ( ,KO′)← Ĝeni(n)
to obtain a random KO′ . Then it acts like Ênc, but
usesKO′ instead ofKO for the—overall—first i queries
to HX , X ∈ {R,S} that it makes during its lifetime.
Now regard the sequence of encryption schemes Π̂0, Π̂1, . . .
Surely, Π̂0 behaves exactly like Π̂, so we have:
Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂0
(n) = 1] = Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂ (n) = 1] (14)
We can further see that—up to the i-th oracle query—
Ênci behaves exactly like E˜nc, since it uses a fresh, ran-
domly generated key KO′ for each encryption application
instead of the supplied value KO .
Now let q(n) be the maximum runtime of A in experi-
ment PrivK
cdpad
A,Π˜ (n). In each step, A can make at most one
query to the encryption oracle, so E˜nc can be executed at
most q(n) times during that experiment. During encryp-
tion of a message m, E˜nc makes at most |m| queries to HR
and at most |m| queries to HS, respectively. As—due to
its runtime—A cannot generate plaintexts of length greater
than q(n), each encryption query results in at most 2q(n)
queries to HX , X ∈ {R,S}, resulting in a maximum total
number of 2q(n)2 queries to HX during the whole experi-
ment. As Ênci and E˜nc are identical up to the i-th query
to HX , this implies:
Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂
2q(n)2
(n) = 1] = Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π˜ (n) = 1] (15)
We show that an adversary cannot distinguish the experi-
ments PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂i
(n) and PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂i−1
(n) with non-negligible
probability: The only difference between both experiments
is that HX(KO′ , x, y) is queried instead of HX(KO, x, y) at
any point of time within the former experiment.
Per definition, A can only succeed if all queries made to
the encryption oracle during the experiment are different in
the sense that no min{w, l}-byte window content occurs in
more than one query. Thus, different success probabilities
for those experiments imply that A adheres to those con-
straints. As w-byte window contents are used as input to
HR by the encryption scheme (see Equation 1) and repeti-
tions of the same w-byte window within a single encryption
application result in different inputs to HR due to the ap-
pearance counter, this implies that all inputs to HR during
the whole experiment are different. Similarly, as the encryp-
tion scheme does not generate chunks smaller than l bytes,
all inputs to HS (see Equation 2) are unique, too.
If A did not query any of the values HX(KO′ , x, y) or
HX(KO, x, y) directly to the oracle, both values are—due to
the random oracle—independent from both all inputs and all
other outputs of the random oracle, so A cannot distinguish
between those values. Different success probabilities in both
experiments thus require that A did query any of those val-
ues within the experiment. As this requires a correct guess
of either KO or KO′ within A’s runtime, the probability for
this to happen is at most 2q(n)
2n
:∣∣∣∣Pr[PrivKcdpadA,Π̂i(n) = 1]− Pr[PrivKcdpadA,Π̂i−1 (n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2q(n)2n (16)
Combining Equations 14, 15 and 16, we get:∣∣∣Pr[PrivKcdpadA,Π˜ (n) = 1]− Pr[PrivKcdpadA,Π̂ (n) = 1]∣∣∣
≤ 2q(n)2 · 2q(n)
2n
=
q(n)3
2n−2
(17)
The only difference between PrivK
cdpad
A,Π˜ (n) and PrivK
cpa
A,Π˜(n)
is that A is less restricted in the latter. We conclude:
Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π̂ (n) = 1] ≤ Pr[PrivK
cdpad
A,Π˜ (n) = 1] +
q(n)3
2n−2
≤ Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π˜(n) = 1] +
q(n)3
2n−2
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) +
q(n)3
2n−2
≤ 1
2
+ negl′(n) (18)
with the last inequality being true because q(n) is polyno-
mially bounded. This shows that Π̂ is CDPAd-secure.
Theorem. If Π̂ achieves CDPAd-secure encryption, Π also
achieves CDPAd-secure encryption.
Proof. The only difference between Π̂, which we have
proven to be CDPAd-secure, and Π is that the latter appends
a MAC tag generated by ΠM to each ciphertext. As the
calculation of this tag does only depend on the ciphertext
and an independent key, its presence surely cannot reduce
the security properties provided by Π̂. We conclude that Π
is CDPAd-secure, too.
Combining both theorems, we have proven that Π achieves
CDPAmin{w,l}−1-secure encryption. Intuitively, this means,
that an arbitrary amount of plaintexts may be encrypted
using the same (KR,KO ,KI) key triple without leaking any
information to an attacker, as long as none of those plain-
texts share a substring of length min{w, l} bytes.
6.2.2 Security Guarantees for Similar Plaintexts
While the model presented in the previous section pro-
vides strong security guarantees under certain conditions,
we have to intentionally leak some information to achieve
storage efficiency. In other words, the conditions required
for the proof cannot always be met. We therefore describe
what information an attacker can gain in the general case.
It is easy to see that identical plaintexts are always en-
crypted to the same ciphertext (if KR,KO and KI are un-
changed), so in this case, an attacker can see nothing more
than how often a specific plaintext was encrypted.
The encryption of different, but similar plaintexts (that
share a substring of length at least min{w, l} bytes) using
the same key is the most common use case. We analyze
what information is leaked in this case to provide an intu-
ition that our design decisions are reasonable. The analysis
is performed in two steps: First we focus on security im-
plications of our chunk encryption scheme, later we analyze
the chunking procedure.
Security Implications of Chunk Encryption
Imagine all chunk boundaries have been determined com-
pletely randomly. Letm1, . . . ,mM be the list of all messages
that have been encrypted with Π̂ using the same key and let
c1, . . . , cM be their respective ciphertexts. Let further mji
denote the i-th chunk of message mj and let cji denote its
encrypted representation. Clearly, our deterministic encryp-
tion mechanism leaks information about equality of chunks8.
But what information is leaked beyond equality?
To analyze this, regard the sequence of all different chunks
m′1, . . . ,m
′
r that have ever been encrypted using the same
key and let C′i denote the maximum number of occurrences
of m′i within any single message. From those chunks, we can
build a plaintext m =
fr
i=1
(fC′i
j=1m
′
i
)
. If we apply a modi-
fied version of Π˜, that achieves exactly that chunking, to m,
we get a ciphertext c that contains all encrypted chunks that
are contained in c1, . . . , cM . Thus, c1, . . . , cM can be recon-
structed from c just using knowledge about which substrings
have to be concatenated in which order, so all non-positional
information leaked by c1, . . . , cM is leaked by c, too.
In this setup, however, we have only a single application of
our encryption scheme that uses a random value KO , which
is CPA-secure as shown in Section 6.1. We conclude that
chunk encryptions do not leak information beyond positions
and sizes of contents.
If an attacker knows KO (e.g. because he has read access
to another revision that uses the same KO), he can encrypt
plaintexts (and also determine chunk boundaries) himself,
allowing a verification of guessed plaintexts. Therefore, the
default behaviour of our implementation is to change KO on
access rights changes.
8This applies across revisions of the same file with equalKO,
not within one revision due to the appearance counters.
Security Implications of Chunking
We have already seen that an encrypted chunk for itself
does not leak any information about its underlying plain-
text. However, due to the context-sensitive chunking proce-
dure, we can think of each chunk as being annotated with
some information about its plaintext visible to an adversary.
To see which information is leaked, regard an arbitrary but
fixed chunk ci. From the chunking mechanism, an attacker
gets to know the following facts:
• If ci occurs within any message at any position other
than its beginning, the attacker knows that the first
w bytes of the chunk fulfill Condition 1.
• The attacker knows that no w-bytes substring within
the last |ci|− l bytes of ci fulfill Condition 1 within any
yet encrypted message that contains ci.
We emphasize that an adversary cannot evaluate Condi-
tion 1 for any plaintext without knowledge about KO, so
this information does not obviously allow to draw conclu-
sions about the plaintext. However, when two revisions of
a file are encrypted using the same KO , limited structural
information about that file might be leaked: Chunking may
reveal the positions of changes more precisely than the en-
cryption procedure itself, if a change affects a chunk bound-
ary. In addition, changed chunk boundaries might affect
chunk appearance counters and thus the encryption of later
equal chunks, so that those chunk ciphertexts might appear
to move between two revisions. However, both potential is-
sues are in line with our security claims, which allow reveal-
ing the positions and extent of changes if KO is unchanged.
7. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the full concept, as described in
the previous sections, into the SVN library source code9,
extended the SVN command line application, and evaluated
the performance of our implementation.
We wanted to retain full compatibility to other SVN ver-
sions to enable a quick deployment of our extension. We
have therefore realized nearly all parts of our solution on
the client side—namely the working copy library—of the
SVN architecture without introducing any new data struc-
tures that would have to be handled by the repository. For
this, we store all data in so-called properties—a versioned
file-related meta-data mechanism provided by the SVN ar-
chitecture. All actions provided by our solution (e.g. en-
cryption/decryption of files, permission administration) are
designed to only affect a file’s representation or its proper-
ties within the user’s working copy, while the synchroniza-
tion between a working copy and the repository (e.g. com-
mit/update operations) stays unchanged.
Key management is implemented as follows: All keys are
generated randomly when a confidential file is created or ac-
cess rights are changed. To allow data deduplication, we do
not automatically change a file’s KO when new revisions are
generated. A simple command line option allows to achieve
stronger security guarantees by explicitly changing KO.
Regarding compatibility, we support arbitrary combina-
tions between old/new server (repository) versions and old/
new client versions. If a client supports our extension, it
can securely use our access control solution on some files no
matter what other SVN versions are involved at the server
9We extended revision 1152561 of the repository’s trunk (ht
tps://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/subversion/trunk)
and at the client side. Clients not supporting our solution
would just be unable to access confidential files—just like
new SVN clients that are not granted rights on those files.
If the server runs an old version, only server-side checks like
write access control would be disabled, so other clients would
be able to delete confidential files. However, such files could
still be restored due to the version history provided by SVN.
8. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have presented a security solution for the version con-
trol system SVN, which enables secure and storage-efficient
versioning of documents—even in case of a malicious repos-
itory server administrator. The main restrictions of the sys-
tem are the attacker’s capability of seeing the positions of
changes in a document, and of verifying whether chunks
from a previous version (to which the attacker had been
granted access) are still contained in a new version. Both
attacks can be prevented by changing the file’s obfuscator,
but this comes at the cost of storage efficiency. Our imple-
mentation does not require changes to SVN’s storage back-
end, and is compatible with previous SVN servers (with the
exception of write access control) and clients (though old
clients cannot access encrypted files). Authentication cur-
rently relies on passwords only, as we wanted to avoid the
administrative overhead of a PKI. For corporate environ-
ments, certificate-based authentication may still be a viable
alternative, which we aim at supporting in the future.
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APPENDIX
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our solution’s performance
regarding memory and time efficiency. We first discuss an
appropriate choice of the parameter values and then analyze
their impact on storage efficiency to prove our savings in
comparison to usual encryption schemes. Finally, we briefly
evaluate our algorithm’s memory and time requirements.
A.1 Choice of Parameters
As mentioned in Section 5.1.1, our encryption scheme de-
pends on some parameter values w (window size), l (mini-
mum chunk size) and S (target chunk size). We set w =
48 bytes according to the evaluation results provided by
Muthitacharoen et al. [14]. For a random file of size z bytes
(and with parameter value l = 1 byte), we calculated an
average encryption overhead of 43.5z
S
+ 32 bytes for storing
chunk metadata (length and key), padding and the integrity
value. We confirmed this formula to be true for non-random
data by encrypting the 50 most popular ebooks (47.9 MiB
in total) from Project Gutenberg10, each as UTF8-encoded
text file, with randomly chosen keys with values of S in in-
10http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/search.html/?sort_o
rder=downloads, visited on 2012-03-13
terval [32, 4096], which resulted in an average deviation of
0.07 percentage points and a maximum deviation of 1.24
percentage points from the expected relative overhead. As
our security guarantees depend on min{w, l} (see Sec. 6.2),
we set l = w, which in addition guarantees a maximum stor-
age overhead of z+32 bytes. With S ≥ 256, we produce an
overhead of < 20%, which we consider an acceptable over-
head that we expect to be compensated by the savings due
to difference-based efficient storage of multiple file revisions.
A.2 Storage Efficiency
While we have shown that an appropriate parameter choice
allows storing single file versions with little overhead, our
main goal is the efficient storage of whole repositories con-
taining multiple (and similar) revisions of several files. Our
system requires storage overhead at several locations. The
main overhead—as described before—is caused by the meta-
data generated by our encryption scheme and depends on
the file’s size as well as the parameter value S. In addition,
since we store all access-control-relevant information (such
as cryptographic material) in the confidential file’s proper-
ties, every confidential file requires some storage for these
properties. The storage requirement for this can be quanti-
fied with about 1.5 KiB constant overhead per file and 2 KiB
constant overhead per authorized user of this file. Note,
however, that thanks to differential storage this is only gen-
erated once per access right change (at least once per file),
not once per revision. Despite that, we also generate small
overhead when storing different file revisions: While for un-
encrypted files, only the contents that actually changed (+ a
negligible overhead) have to be stored, our solution requires
storage for each change’s full surrounding chunk(s).
To evaluate our achievements regarding storage efficiency
of similar file revisions, we first studied our algorithm’s per-
formance on a kind of best-case scenario, namely a reposi-
tory that contains the version history of a single file, with
only small changes made between each of its revisions. We
simulated this situation by setting up an experiment as fol-
lows: At first, we committed an empty, confidential file to a
fresh SVN repository. Afterwards, we iterated the following
sequence: We chose a position within that file uniformly at
random and inserted a random number (chosen uniformly
at random in interval [64, 192], i.e. 128 bytes on average)
of random bytes there. The resulting extended file version
was then committed to the repository, so the file and its
version history grew with each iteration. Using the gen-
erated repository, we compared our encryption scheme to
other solutions: For this purpose, we generated a couple of
fresh repositories and re-enacted the previously described
repository’s version history for each of them with individ-
ual configurations. In the first configuration, we achieved
confidentiality by encrypting each file revision using a tra-
ditional encryption scheme (AES-CBC with a fixed key, but
randomly chosen IVs); in the remaining ones, we used our
access control solution with different parameter values S.
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 1. Each
line represents the development of the total storage require-
ment of a specific repository when storing the first i revi-
sions. The black line (+ markers) shows the unencrypted
repository, which unsurprisingly has the least storage con-
sumption. The violet line (× markers) shows the repository
whose content is encrypted with a traditional scheme. As
expected, its storage consumption rises rapidly with an in-
Figure 1: Development of repository size when a
versioned confidential file is extended systematically
creasing number of revisions due to the need for storing the
whole ciphertext of each file version. While the storage effi-
ciency of our encryption scheme varies for different values of
S, its savings are significant for either value. S = 256 yields
the best performance and requires about twice as much stor-
age as the unencrypted configuration. This is in line with
our expectation that small (e.g. about-128-byte) changes re-
sult in about S bytes of difference in ciphertext on average.
These results could suggest that a lower S results in lower
storage consumption in general, so we repeated the experi-
ment with changes of average length 4 096 bytes instead of
128 bytes between revisions. In this setup, our solution pro-
duced less overhead and our savings compared to traditional
encryption were more significant. However, savings through
small chunk sizes (i.e. small differences between ciphertexts)
were outweighed by overhead for storing chunk metadata.
S = 512 yields the best results in that experiment.
While these results show that our encryption scheme al-
lows for efficient storage in some hypothetic best-case sce-
nario, we surely have to verify if these results are transferable
into practice. In fact, we identified two problematic situa-
tions for our access control solution. The first is a reposi-
tory consisting of a huge amount of very small files: Since
we have to store metadata for each of these files separately,
our system would generate a lot of overhead, which might
not be compensated by further savings if the file sizes are
not considerably greater than our chunk sizes. The second
case is a repository consisting of arbitrary files, which do not
contain any change history (i.e. each file has only a single
revision) or only changes that affect whole file contents. In
this case, our encryption scheme would generate chunking-
related metadata overhead that is not compensated by space
savings due to similar file revisions.
To verify whether these drawbacks are of practical rele-
vance, we evaluated our solution using some real-life data.
For this, we re-enacted the version history of the trunk of
the open source project ispCP11, which consists of many
small (≈ 10 KiB) source code files as well as rarely-changed
files such as pictures. Thus, this example combines elements
from both problematic scenarios discussed above. Analo-
gously to the previous experiments, the results are shown in
Fig. 2. Since the repository starts with a kind of worst-case
situation (at the beginning, 2 768 small (≈ 10 KiB) files are
added), the storage efficiency of our solution seems to be
worse than the one with traditional encryption. With an in-
creasing number of revisions, however, our solution’s savings
compared to traditional encryption get significant again.
11http://isp-control.net; repository: http://www.isp-c
ontrol.net:800/ispcp_svn/trunk, requested on 2012-03-26
Figure 2: Development of ispCP’s repository size
A.3 Memory and Time Requirements
We have seen that our access control solution allows ef-
ficient storage of encrypted repositories. We now consider
the amount of memory and time needed to en-/decrypt con-
fidential files. Besides the specific implementation, there are
conceptual aspects critical to memory / time consumption.
A trivial implementation has two main drawbacks:
1. Encryption consumes memory in the order of about 48
times the file size as it has to count the appearances of
each 48-byte window content (see Sec. 5.1.1).
2. As HMAC computations are time-consuming, comput-
ing a rolling HMAC (one computation for every byte of
the file size) significantly slows down encryption.
To find a suitable trade-off between memory / time effi-
ciency and security, we evaluated 4 variants of our algorithm:
• HMAC, no repetitions: This is a trivial reference im-
plementation of our concept, which implements appearance
counters using hash tables. This version is memory-consu-
ming, but adheres strictly to the description in Sec. 5.
• HMAC, no repetitions, bloom filter : This variant is sim-
ilar to the first, but implements the rolling hash appearance
counter using a bloom filter [2], achieving memory consump-
tion of about 3 times of the file size by allowing false positives
(i.e. repetitions could be detected by mistake). As false neg-
atives are excluded, this only affects storage efficiency, not
security (rolling hash values might change, but repetitions
are still excluded).
• HMAC : This variant ignores repetitions of rolling hash
values, so periodical file contents could lead to periodical
chunk boundaries visible in ciphertexts. This has a slightly
negative effect on the security properties when applied to
files with repeating contents, but—if this limitation is ac-
ceptable—significantly reduces memory consumption.
• Rabin fingerprints: By using an efficient rolling hash
function (i.e. Rabin fingerprints [16]) for rolling hash compu-
tation (and still ignoring repetitions), encryption is speeded
up dramatically. However, while we expect its impact on
security to be negligible, we do not recommend this variant
as it might leak information about chunk boundaries.
The experiments—performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-2500K machine with 16 GiB RAM—confirmed our ex-
pectations: With 3.3 seconds for encrypting a 16 MiB file,
the Rabin fingerprint variant performs about 10 times faster
than the corresponding HMAC variant—but leads to secu-
rity drawbacks. The significant decrease (factor 10) of mem-
ory consumption achieved by the bloom filter is also done
at the expense of computing time (factor 2). When consid-
ering only the two provably secure variants, we consider the
bloom filter variant the best trade-off. Thus, this variant is
our default and has been used for the other experiments.
